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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
REAL PROPERTY-RESIDENTIAL PARKS-STREETS-EASEMENTS.

-Plaintiff is the owner of land in a residential park, known as Sea
Gate and asks the Court to enjoin the defendant from maintaining a
fence that interferes with his ingress and egress. The defendant, a
land development company, has title to all private streets in Sea Gate.
Years before, in order to insure privacy and protect the property
rights of the residents, it erected a high fence around said property
and stationed a guard at the gate to prevent disinterested parties
from entering. This was the only entrance and exit to the public
street. A map, fully describing this property and picturing it as now
laid out, was deposited in the Clerk's office of Kings County. Plaintiff, for some reason manifestly opposed to its interest as a proprietor,
objected to the fence, claiming that it was deprived thereby of access
to the public street. Thereupon the defendant removed the section
of the fence bordering on the plaintiff's property but further constructed the fence so as to preclude the plaintiff from access to the
private streets. Held, defendant has the right to maintain existing
fences to exclude the plaintiff's property from the protected area, or,
at the option of the plaintiff the re-erection of the old fence, thereby
to include the plaintiff's lots within the area. Erit Realty Corporation v. Sea Gate Association, 249 N. Y. 52 (1928).
This decision is consistent with the law of our State and others.1
It has been held that, in the case of express grants of easements in
existing ways, which are obstructed by fences and gates then physically present upon the ground, the enjoyment of the easement granted
is made subject to the right of the grantor reasonably to limit access
and egress by maintaining the obstruction.2
If this be the correct doctrine, its application to easements resting
in implication must be all the more apparent. In such case the intention of the grantor is gathered from the pictorial representation of
the streets. If the map portrayed fences and gates erected across
them, the obstructions depicted would undoubtedly enter into the
implication to limit the rights impliedly granted. Here the fences are
actually present on the ground to obstruct the user.
The obstructions do not tend to vary or qualify the express
words of a grant, since none have been employed to make it. Sound
reasoning compels us to believe that plaintiff took its easement in the
streets of Sea Gate subject to the right of the grantor or its successor,
this defendant, reasonably to limit its use by means of this fence, since
it was actually present at the time the grant was made. This conclusion is in accordance with sound principles of law as evidenced by
the case of Drabinsky v. Seagate Asso.3
1

Connery v. Brooke, 73 Penn. St. 80 (1873) ; Boyd v. Bloom, 152 Ind. 152,
52 N. E. 751 (1898) ; Garland v. Furber, 47 N. H. 301 (1867) ; Brill v. Brill,
108 N. Y. 511, 15 N. E. 538 (1888).
2Ibid.

'239 N. Y. 321, 146 N. E. 614 (1925).

RECENT DECISIONS
In that case a conveyance of lots in the Sea Gate tract with ref-4
erence to the field map, was under consideration. The Court said,
" * * * at the time this original grantee took title the defendant already
maintained a fence * * * and 'guard * * * and it enforced regulations
for admission through the entrance gate of only persons known to be
property owners or persons * * * having business with property
owners.' It must, therefore, have been clear to the grantee that his
grantor did not intend to grant him a right to use the street except
in the manner that a street in such a private residential colony would
be used."
The essential facts are the same as those provided here. The
decision is conclusive upon the right of the defendant to maintain a
fence to reasonably regulate admission to the community. The plaintiff is protected in all the rights to which it is entitled by this judgment. Injunction properly denied.
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SECURITY AFTER EVICTIoN GOVERNED BY TEMs OF THE LEASE.-

Plaintiff's assignors deposited $6,000. with defendant Aaron as security on a lease for ten years. The lease provided that the money
should be retained by the landlord until the expiration of the term
when it was 'to be returned with interest unless the tenants had
forfeited it by a violation of the covenants or conditions of the lease.
In the event that the landlord re-entered for breach by tenants of
these provisions, he was to have the right to terminate or relet as
tenants' agents. Thereafter the landlord, sold the premises and the
lease to defendant Mazer, transferring at the same time, the deposit,
upon the latter's agreement to indemnify him against any claim therefor by the tenants. Subsequently, Mazer brought dispossess proceedings against the tenants and obtained a final order in summary proceedings against them. Plaintiff thereupon brought this action to
recover the deposit upon the ground that the lease was terminated.
Held, for the defendant. The action was prematurely brought.
Rosenfeld v. Aaron, 248 N. Y. 437 (1928).
The conveyance of the property to Mazer did not terminate the
tenants' obligation under the lease.1 Where the deposit is not transferred to the grantee the security agreement is a mere collateral
covenant not running with the land.2 Here the grantee received the
deposit and agreed to indemnify the original landlord. The covenant
to return passed to the grantee subject to the terms of the lease.
Though no warrant to dispossess was issued 3 the removal of the
tenants after the issuance and service of the precept cancelled and
IIbid., 327.
'Kottler
v. N. Y. Bargain House, 242 N. Y. 28, 150 N. E. 591 (1926).
2
Fallert Brewing Co., Ltd. v. Blass, 119 A. D. 53, 103 N. Y. S. 865 (2nd
Dept. 1907).
' C. P. A., Sec. 1434.

